Urbanization: A Challenge and an Opportunity

Tanzania is urbanizing at a remarkable pace, with cities expanding faster than the systems designed to support them. Today, nearly 40% of the population lives in urban areas. It is projected that the population will be more than double by 2050, placing unprecedented pressure on housing, water, sanitation, and urban infrastructure. In Dar es Salaam, one of the fastest-growing cities in the world, the population is on a clear trajectory towards megacity status, expected to exceed 10–12 million by 2030 and surpass 20 million by 2050. This is not merely a demographic shift; it is a defining national development challenge that will shape the country’s economic and social future. Yet this rapid urban expansion is not being matched by a commensurate evolution in service delivery systems. The pace, scale, and complexity of urban growth are outstripping the capacity of existing water supply and sanitation infrastructure, exposing deep structural weaknesses in how services are planned, financed, and managed.

There is an uncomfortable truth we must confront: urban water supply and sanitation services in Tanzania are no longer keeping pace with reality. While demand continues to surge as a result of rapid urbanization, population growth, industrial expansion, and rising service expectations, service delivery systems are steadily falling behind. The question is no longer whether reform is needed; the real question is whether we are bold enough to pursue it.

On the other hand, there is a question of mindset. Most utilities consider urbanization as merely a challenge while it can also be seen as a commercial and institutional opportunity. It expands demands, broadens the revenue base, and creates the scaled needed for efficient and financially sustainable water service delivery. The task before utilities is to organize themselves well enough to benefit from this growth.

Lessons from RUWASA Experience

History teaches us that meaningful development never happens without disruption. As the “Father of Classical Physics,” Isaac Newton, observed, systems remain unchanged unless acted upon by an external force. Similarly, one of the most influential scientists of the 20th century, Albert Einstein, famously warned against the futility of repeating the same actions while expecting different outcomes. Yet, this is precisely what is happening in the urban water sub-sector whereby existing structures that are increasingly becoming unfit for the purpose, are preserved while hoping for better results.

We have seen before that bold thinking delivers results. The reforms initiated by the Ministry of Water in 2019, culminating in the establishment of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency (RUWASA), fundamentally transformed rural water service delivery. That shift required questioning long-held assumptions, challenging institutional arrangements, and making politically difficult decisions, thanks to the 5^th and 6^th Presidents of the United Republic of Tanzania who took bold decision to change the then long-standing “status quo”. Today, few would argue against its strategic importance.

So why are we hesitant to apply the same courage to urban water supply and sanitation services?

Current Performance of Urban Water Utilities

Evidence from the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA), the Controller and Auditor General (CAG), and Ministry of Water performance reviews paints a worrying picture: declining operational efficiency, high levels of Non-Revenue Water (NRW), poor cost recovery, weak asset management, overstretched infrastructure, and limited investment in sanitation.

Many utilities are struggling to meet even basic technical and financial sustainability benchmarks. These are not temporary setbacks; they are structural signals of a system increasingly misaligned with the scale, speed, and complexity of urban growth.

EWURA reports consistently show that while a few large utilities demonstrate relative strength, a significant number of small and medium urban utilities continue to underperform in key areas such as continuity of supply, sewerage coverage, billing efficiency, collection efficiency, and debt servicing capacity. According to EWURA, 54 out of 83 urban water utilities, nearly two-thirds, fail to meet even basic service and cost-recovery standards, exposing a system under severe strain. Many remain dependent on government subsidies simply to sustain operations, let alone expand infrastructure.

Thoughtful Ambition: The Case for a National Water Grid

Tanzania is pursuing an even bigger national ambition: the long-term vision of creating an interconnected national water grid, where multiple water sources across the country are linked to serve both urban centers and rural communities more reliably and efficiently, much like the national electricity grid. This is a transformative idea. It recognizes that water security can no longer depend solely on isolated town-based or village-based sources, especially in the face of climate variability, rapid urbanization, and growing demand.

Undeniably, the ambition of creating the interconnected national water grid cannot be effectively delivered through a fragmented institutional model where each utility operates largely as an independent island. The national water grid requires strategic planning of bulk water production, transmission, storage, and inter-basin connectivity at a much higher level. It demands stronger governance of shared infrastructure, clearer asset ownership, professional management of bulk supply systems, and financing models capable of supporting large-scale strategic investments. In short, it requires institutions designed for integration and not fragmentation.

The current model of semi-autonomous Water Supply and Sanitation Authorities (WSSAs), introduced in the late 1990s, may have been fit for purpose at the time. But nearly three decades later, it is time to ask a hard question: has “autonomy” truly delivered? Has it produced financially viable, efficient utilities, or has it created a fragmented landscape of small entities duplicating overheads, struggling to scale, and diluting accountability? Aren’t we preserving institutions for their historical value rather than their present performance? In a context where most utilities cannot even cover basic operational costs, autonomy without performance begins to look less like reform and more like drift.

Clustering as an Intervention to Rescue Inefficient Small Town WSSAs

Meanwhile, on its pursuit to improve service delivery in some smaller towns, the Ministry of Water is implementing what is commonly referred to as “clustering” of WSSAs, whereby some WSSAs in small towns are dissolved and integrated into their respective regional headquarters WSSAs. Examples of towns already clustered include:

Mwanza WSSA:       Ngudu, Magu, Nansio, and Misungwi towns

Musoma WSSA:      Shirati, Tarime, and Mugumu towns

Tanga WSSA:         Pangani, Muheza, and Mkinga towns

Iringa WSSA:         Kilolo and Ilula towns

Moshi WSSA:          Hai, Same, and Mwanga towns

Babati WSSA:         Katesh, Hanang, Mbulu, Orkesumet, Dareda, and Magugu towns

Arusha WSSA:        Monduli, Mererani, Longido, and Namanga towns

Additionally, in the same spirit of “clustering”, there has been a trend whereby Community Based Water Supply Organizations (CBWSOs) are also dissolved and their villages integrated to respective regional headquarter WSSAs. This is done through redefining “service areas” under the WSSAs. It should be recalled that these CBWSOs are legally established, trained and facilitated by RUWASA to manage rural water infrastructure and provide service to respective communities.

However, clustering alone is not a silver bullet. Without parallel reforms in governance, management, and financial performance, clustering risks merely scaling-up existing inefficiencies. Clustering financially stressed utilities with weak cost recovery is like merging one patient in ICU with another one already bedridden. Scale alone does not restore health; it merely concentrates the crisis. In many cases, this results in aggregating liabilities rather than improving viability, creating larger, but still fragile institutions. For clustering to deliver real value, it must be accompanied by deep reforms: strengthened leadership and accountability, cost-reflective tariffs, improved operational efficiency (particularly NRW reduction), and disciplined financial management.

Lessons from Uganda’s Experience

Uganda offers an important point of reflection. Unlike Tanzania, Uganda consolidated urban water services under one national utility—the National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC). While not perfect, NWSC has demonstrated notable institutional successes: stronger financial sustainability, better internal revenue generation, improved professional management, stronger operational discipline, standardized systems, and the ability to cross-subsidize smaller towns using revenues from stronger urban centers such as Kampala.

Recent performance reports indicate that NWSC has consistently generated operating surpluses, significantly expanded customer connections, and maintained stronger utility-wide benchmarking and management accountability than is commonly seen in fragmented systems. Comparative studies have also shown higher operational efficiency and stronger customer orientation under NWSC than in many fragmented utility models across the region.

A New Management Model: One Strong Utility per Region

The reference made in Uganda does not necessarily mean that Tanzania should also create a single national urban water utility. Our political, geographic, and institutional realities are different. However, Uganda demonstrates an important lesson: consolidation can improve efficiency, professional management, and financial sustainability where fragmentation creates persistent weakness. However, this raises an important and practical question: if creating one national urban utility for the entire country may not be politically or institutionally appropriate, can we instead cluster utilities at the regional level and establish one strong utility per region? In other words, should Tanzania move toward one utility per region rather than one utility per town?

Crucially, this model also creates a long-overdue opportunity not only on water supply but also sanitation, whereby on-site sanitation services can be formalized and professionalized. Regional utilities could take on integrated responsibility for fecal sludge management covering containment standards, emptying services, transport logistics, treatment facilities, and safe reuse or disposal, thereby closing the persistent gap where sanitation, especially in rapidly expanding peri-urban and informal settlements, remains fragmented and underinvested. This integrated mandate strengthens the case for consolidation.

Such a model of “one strong utility per region” preserves local responsiveness while maximizing economies of scale, reducing duplicated overhead costs, strengthening technical capacity, and enabling cross-subsidization between financially strong and financially weak service areas within the same region. Smaller, struggling utilities would no longer be left to independently manage finance, engineering, procurement, human resources, and debt obligations with insufficient revenue bases.

The Need for Separation of Core Responsibilities

At a higher strategic level, Tanzania may also need to seriously consider separating water production and transmission from retail distribution. Strategic water sources, treatment plants, trunk mains, transmission systems, and future national water grid infrastructure could be placed under one strong national or regional bulk water entity, while regional utilities focus on customer service, local distribution networks, billing, and retail service delivery. This model would align naturally with the aforementioned national water grid vision and would allow strategic infrastructure to be planned and managed as national economic infrastructure rather than fragmented local assets.

A regional clustering model could be transformative, building stronger technical and professional capacity, improving procurement efficiency, and enabling better asset management. By consolidating utilities, it could enhance creditworthiness and borrowing capacity, support internal cross-subsidization, and reduce political fragmentation. At the same time, it would strengthen regulatory oversight and create a more coherent platform for long-term, investment-driven planning. Frankly, many small standalone WSSAs may simply no longer be viable as independent commercial utilities.

Fundamental Questions on the Current Institutional Setup

We must therefore be willing to ask difficult and even uncomfortable questions:

• Why do we maintain dozens of separate water authorities across the country when many struggle to achieve operational and financial sustainability?
• Would fewer, stronger regional utilities deliver better outcomes than the current fragmented structure?
• If Uganda can operate successfully with one national utility, why can Tanzania not at least pursue stronger regional consolidation?
• If Tanzania is serious about building a national water grid, can fragmented local utilities remain the most appropriate governance model?
• Is it still rational for individual utilities to manage everything from water production to retail distribution, or has this model overstretched institutional capacity?
• Are utilities too removed from customers despite their decentralized structure, undermining the very responsiveness they were meant to enhance?
• Why not separate bulk water production and transmission from retail distribution, placing strategic infrastructure under basin-level, regional, or national management as seen in countries such as Israel, South Africa, and Namibia?

More importantly, we must confront the financial reality:

• Why are most urban utilities unable to independently finance their own expansion?
• Why do so many utilities remain unable to meet even basic cost-recovery thresholds?
• What is preventing government from legally empowering well-performing utilities to borrow from financial institutions and invest in infrastructure like serious commercial entities?
• If utilities cannot demonstrate creditworthiness, what does that reveal about governance, management, and operational discipline?

And then comes the question many are reluctant to address:

• Why has the private sector remained largely on the margins of urban water service delivery?
• What transformations are necessary to make utilities credible and attractive partners for private investment, whether in financing, infrastructure development, or operations?
• Are we genuinely open to models such as Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), or are we still constrained by outdated fears and assumptions?

Avoiding these questions will not make the problems disappear. On the contrary, it will deepen them. The reality is that incremental adjustments will not fix a system facing structural challenges. What is required is the same kind of bold, system-wide rethink that gave birth to RUWASA. This demands political will, institutional courage, and a readiness to disrupt entrenched institutional comfort zones.

Concluding Remarks

Urban Tanzania is growing fast. If water services fail to keep up, the consequences will extend far beyond inconvenience. They will affect public health, economic productivity, industrial competitiveness, environmental sustainability, and the overall livability of our towns and cities. We should not afford to wait for the system to collapse before we act.

Founding President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere, once said: “We cannot solve our problems by pretending they do not exist.” The time to question, to rethink, and to reform is now.

About the Author

Eng. Clement KIVEGALO is a distinguished Civil and Water Resources Engineer with over 24 years of professional experience in Tanzania’s water sector and more than 18 years in senior executive leadership. He has served in several strategic national positions, including Director General of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Agency (RUWASA), Director of Urban Water Supply and Sanitation at the Ministry of Water, Managing Director of Kahama Shinyanga Water Supply and Sanitation Authority (KASHWASA), and Programme Officer for the Water and Sanitation Sector at the Agence Francaise de Developpement (AFD) of France.

Throughout his career, he has played a significant role in planning, designing, implementing, and managing major water supply and sanitation projects across Tanzania, working closely with government institutions, development partners, water utilities, and the private sector. He has contributed to key national water sector reforms, policy development, institutional strengthening, and donor-funded infrastructure programs.

His leadership has been instrumental in improving service delivery, strengthening utility performance, and expanding access to safe and reliable water services for both urban and rural communities. He is widely recognized for his expertise in strategic planning, procurement and contract management, infrastructure development, and sustainable sector reforms.

At the age of 55, he voluntarily retired from the public service in December 2024. Currently, he is a Consulting Engineer registered by the Tanzania Engineers Registration Board (CE 597) and serves as Managing Director of a newly established private consulting company namely RCJ Consult Ltd of Dar Es Salaam, where he continues to provide professional consultancy and strategic advisory services in infrastructure development, institutional strengthening and management, and sustainable investment initiatives particularly in the water sector.

Disclaimer

The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author, a retired public servant, and are based on personal experience and professional reflection. They do not represent the official position of the Government of Tanzania, any ministry, agency, or institution with which the author was previously affiliated.

This article is intended to contribute to public dialogue on sector development and reform. Any analysis, interpretations, or recommendations offered are made in good faith and should not be construed as official policy statements or endorsements.